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Many studies analyzed in depth how aging affects aggregate economic performance. But 
analyses of these effects on the employment structure are scarce and they do not consider that 
consumption patterns, the supply of goods and services, and also sectoral labor productivity 
are all likely to adjust to aging and will change. Hence, regression analysis of sectoral em-
ployment shares is proposed that controls for aging. For a large panel of countries and a long 
time period it is found that aging indeed affects relative employment of most sectors statisti-
cally highly significant either positive or negative. We also conclude that aging tends to ac-
celerate ongoing structural change. This enables to derive specific policy implications. The 
approach could thus become a new method in forecasting employment and other effects of 
aging. 
 
JEL classification: J11, O57, C33 









                                                 
1 German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin (uthiessen@diw.de). The author is indebted to Jan-Oliver 
Menz, Boriss Siliverstovs, Ulrich Fritsche and Paul R. Gregory for valuable discussions without implicating 
them. Errors are the sole responsibility of the author.    2
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
Many studies analyzed how aging affects aggregate economic performance (e.g. Börsch-
Supan 2001, Börsch-Supan et al. 2003, 2005, 2006, Bös and von Weizsäcker 1988, Denton 
1988, Oliveira et al. 2005, McMorrow and Roeger 1999 and 2003). There have also been at-
tempts to analyze the effects of aging on both the structure of GDP and private demand for 
goods and services (e.g. Buslei et al. 2007, Börsch-Supan 2003a, 2003b, Lührmann 2005, 
Oliveira et al. 2005, Serow and Sly 1988): These studies use the age specific private con-
sumption patterns and combine them with demographic forecasts. To derive employment ef-
fects of aging, the forecasted consumption changes may be multiplied with sectoral labor pro-
ductivity (Börsch-Supan 2003b). But this approach has several limitations. Firstly, since pri-
vate consumption is analyzed, a substantial part of the economy is omitted. Secondly, the ap-
proach does not consider potential changes in the consumption patterns of the different age 
groups, which may result from responses of the supply of goods and services to aging and 
from demand changes. Thirdly, sectoral labor productivity may also change and the available 
sectoral labor productivity figures may not correspond adequately to the groups of consump-
tion goods and services. 
Another approach of analyzing effects of aging on an economy’s structure is regression analy-
sis of sectoral employment shares that adequately controls for aging. Surprisingly, and to the 
best of our knowledge, this analysis has not yet been performed. Since the process of aging 
intensified considerably during the past decades in many countries, regression analysis cap-
tures the effects of aging: all economic adjustments to aging, be it in the behaviour of con-
sumption patterns, in the supply of goods and services or in productivity, are taken into ac-
count. And the analysis may cover the whole economy.  
The period used for our regressions covers the past three decades when aging accelerated in 
many countries. For a large panel of countries and for this long time period we find that aging 
indeed affects relative employment of most sectors statistically highly significant and either 
positive or negative. The process of structural change, that takes place also in the absence of 
aging, appears to be promoted. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of ‘aging’ and asks whether there are current and future characteristics of demo-
graphic developments that are unique in economic history. Section 3 elaborates briefly on the 
salient features and trends of structural change in our large panel data set. Section 4 provides 
our empirical analysis of the effects of aging on structural change. First we present our esti-
mates and then compare them with findings of the literature. Section 5 concludes.   3
 
II.   A brief look at the aging process: what is different in the coming decades 
from the past 150 years?  
 
It needs to be emphasized and acknowledged that the commonly defined “dependency ratio”, 
i.e. the relation of persons not involved in the working and income generating process relative 
to those that are involved, has been rising in most industrial countries not only since recent 
decades but that this is a very long run development. In many industrial countries this rise has 
a history of several hundred years. There is, however, a difficulty to show this clearcut in a 
graph using the commonly defined so-called dependency ratios, i.e. the ratios of young and/or 
old persons to those of middle age because age is used as the only criteria defining the popula-
tions groups and not actual occupation. But in former times, a larger share of the persons be-
low 20 years of age, were working, i.e. had a gainful occupation, than today. In addition, in 
many countries the share of young people enrolled in higher education has a long term rising 
trend and the average age, at which gainful employment starts, has been increasing. Also there 
may be persons in the age group of the commonly defined labor force (people of 20-65 years) 
that are in fact not participating. Finally, detailed population statistics are starting only in the 
second half of the 19
th century. Overall then, the steepness of the long run declining trend of 
the young-age dependency ratio in many industrial countries tends to be biased downwards. 
This also means that the rising long run trend of the total dependency ratio may be somewhat 
underestimated. At least for the first decades of population statistics in the 19
th and 20
th cen-
tury, the dependency ratios have to be interpreted as carefully as is true with regard to popula-
tion forecasts.
2  
Figure 1 shows for Germany -as an example for industrial countries and beginning in 1871- 
three dependency ratios and the ratios of the old and young to the population. Since particu-
larly the figures for the earliest available years are the most unreliable with regard to eco-
nomic dependency of particular age groups, one can argue that there is a long run trend in-





                                                 
2 Population forecasts should be treated carefully because they can only extrapolate the current state. Neither 
wars, nor deep changes in fertility ratios (such as the so-called German Baby-Boom) nor technical progress (for 
instance the invention of the anti baby pill) are predictable.    4
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Note: The dependency ratios in this figure use the potential labor force, i.e. people between 20 and 65, as 
denominator, whereas the two other indicators use total population. For the Old-age dependency ratio, three 
forecast scenarios are shown. The forecasts start in 2005.  
Source: German Federal Institute for Population Research, German Federal Statistical Office. 
 
There is also a long-lasting demographic trend that started at the beginning of the 20
th century 
and that will accelerate in the coming decades: This is an increase in the ratio of the elderly, 
either relative to total population or to the labor force, i.e. people between 20 and 65 years of 
age.  
This trend occurred in both industrial and developing countries. The important point is that 
this development appears to have accelerated during relatively recent times and that this ac-
celeration may continue in many industrial countries, according to current projections, until 
about 2030-2040.  
Figure 2 shows this for the average of EU 15 countries and several other OECD countries. We 
note that Japan experienced already since two decades the steepest increase in the ratio of 
people above 65 years of age to total population among all OECD countries. By contrast, es-
pecially the Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Norway will stay below the predicted 
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Figure 2: Ratio of population aged 65 and above to total population for selected OECD 
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Source: OECD Factbook 2007: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, Paris. 
 
 
Figure 2 also makes clear, that the aging process of modern societies is a long-lasting trend, 
even if it will intensify in the forthcoming years. This observation led to the idea presented in 
this paper, that future structural economic change may be forecast by using the calculated 
impact of aging in the past. In our empirical analysis we use as proxies for aging both the ratio 
of elderly to population and the old age dependency ratio since there is no prior reason to pre-
fer one of these two indicators of aging.  
 
   6
III.   Salient features of structural change in our panel data set 
 
Our data set includes a maximum of 54 selected developing and developed economies.
3 We 
use ILO employment data for nine sectors and all other data were drawn from the World De-
velopment Indicators data base of the World Bank. The longest time period covered was 
1970-2004. Since this paper concentrates on analyzing effects of aging on the employment 
structure, we use sectoral employment shares as the dependent variable in our regressions. 
These shares are shown in figures 1a-1g together with per capita income, measured in con-
stant purchasing power parity. The figures show clear long run trends of structural change: 
The agricultural employment share is continuously declining with rising per capita income 
(figure 1a). Relative employment in the four sectors ‘manufacturing’, ‘construction’, ‘whole-
sale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels’ and ‘transport, storage, and communication’ is 
first rising and then declining (figures 1b-1e). And there are two large services sectors whose 
employment shares are continuously rising with increasing per capita income, namely ‘finan-
cial and related services’ (figure 1f) and ‘community, social, and personal services’ (figure 
1g)
4. Hence, these data allow us to define ‘normal’ long run structural change as decreases of 
relative employment in the seven sectors:  
-  agriculture,  
-  mining and quarrying,  
-  manufacturing,  
-  electricity, gas and water,  
-  construction,  
-  wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels, and 
-  transport, storage, communication. 
And ‘normality’ means relative employment growth in the remaining two services sectors:  
-  financial services, real estate and related services and  
-  community, social, and personal services. 
 
                                                 
3 Only market economies were included that do not have unusual characteristics, such as, for instance, a very 
small population (less than one million) or an extremely large share of GDP derived from extraction of natural 
resources. The chosen countries were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portu-
gal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United King-
dom, USA, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
4 The latter sector includes government.   7
Figure 1a
Sectoral Employment Share of Agriculture in 55 Market Economies 
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Benchmark defined by selected 55 
market economies using equation 1a
1/ The averages cover for most countries the period 1985-2004. For several countries this period is shorter due to data availability but it includes 
at least 10 years.




Sectoral Employment Share of Manufacturing in 55 Market Economies 
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t Benchmark defined by 
selected 55 market 
economies using equation 2a
1/  The averages cover for most countries the period 1985-2004. For several countries this period is shorter due to data availability but it includes at 
least 10 years.
Source: Own calculations.  
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Figure 1c
Sectoral Employment Share of Construction in 55 Market Economies
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Benchmark line for selected 55 
market economies using 
equation 5a







Sectoral Employment Share of Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels 
in 55 Market Economies
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Benchmark line for selected 
55 market economies using 
equation 6a
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Figure 1e
Sectoral Employment Share of Transport, Storage, and Communication in 55 Market Economies 
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Benchmark line for selected 
55 market economies using 
equation 7a







Sectoral Employment Share of Financial and Related Services in 55 Market Economies 
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Benchmark lines for selected 
55 market economies using 
equation 8a
1/  The averages cover for most countries the period 1985-2004. For several countries this period is shorter due to data availability but it includes 
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Figure 1g
Sectoral Employment Share of Community, Social, and Personal Services in 
55 Market Economies
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Benchmark line for selected 
55 market economies using 
equation 9a 
1/ The averages cover for most countries the period 1985-2004. For several countries this period is shorter due to data availability but it 






IV.  Empirical estimates of the effects of aging on structural change 
 
 
a.  Panel regressions  
 
 
We use panel regressions for our sample of up to 55 selected developing and developed 
economies to explain their sectoral employment shares. We report the results of the total of 
nine sectors. The explanatory variables included per capita income (Ypc), measured in pur-
chasing power parities, and its square to account for non-linear relationships, the size of the 
economies proxied by population (POP), and the endowment of natural resources (NR).
5 We 
                                                 
5 These variables were first introduced with the methodology of analyzing structural change pioneered by Chen-
ery and his associates, see Chenery 1960, Chenery and Taylor 1968, Chenery and Syrquin, 1975. In the context 
of the analysis of structural change in transition economies the methodology was becoming popular again, see, 
for instance, Döhrn and Heilemann (1996), and Raiser et al. (2004). We proxied agricultural resources by per-
menant cropland per capita. Other natural resources were proxied by a resource depletion index, defined as de-
pletion of energy and minerals, and net forest depletion, in percent of gross national income, where each type of 
depletion was given equal weight. A third proxy for all natural resources was also considered, namely the share 
of primary exports (agricultural raw materials, ores, basic metals, and fuels) in exports of goods and services.    11
also include proxies for “openness” (Trade), i.e. the sum of exports and imports as a ratio to 
GDP, human capital (HC), namely school and higher education enrollment ratios, to measure 
potential effects of education, several variables to capture the effect of government policies 
(GP), namely the government consumption expenditure share
6, tax revenues to GDP, taxes on 
international trade to GDP, and military expenditure shares. A dummy variable (D) is in-
cluded to account for the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis in five countries (Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand).
7 However, our variable of primary interest is aging (A), 
represented by the two proxies already described, namely the ratio of elderly either to the total 
population or to the labor force.
8  
All variables were transformed into natural logarithms except the dummy and the proxies for 
natural resources. The regressions include a constant for each country and a time dummy for 
each year (cross-section and period fixed effects model).
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where i represents the sectors, j represents the countries, uj represents country specific effects, 
vt represents period specific effects, and ejt is an error term.  
 
Only for some sectors we expect certain signs of the independent variables. In most cases they 
are theoretically indeterminate as shown in parenthesis below the independent variables in 
equation 1, including our aging variable. For instance, with regard to agriculture we expect a 
declining employment share as per capita income rises and thus a positive sign for coefficient 
a1 and a negative sign for coefficient a2. Since international trade promotes adjustment of the 
production structure according to comparative advantage, which tends to promote production 
                                                 
6 We emphasize that this variable is simultaneously a proxy for the size of the public sector.  
7 The dummy variable equals one for these two years and these five countries, and zero otherwise. 
8 Since we use mainly data provided by the World Bank, the group of elderly is defined as persons above 64 
years o f age. The labor force is defined as persons between 20 and 64 years of age.  
9 Formal tests of each regression strongly argued in favor of the two-way fixed effects model against the model 
with no fixed effects: the Hausman specification test rejected consistently the random-effects model as a valid 
specification and the likelihood ratio test rejected consistently the hypothesis of no fixed effects. For reasons of 
space the estimates for country and year dummies are, however, not reported in table 1.    12
in the long-run in all trading partner countries, a positive sign of the trade variable would be 
expected for sectors producing tradeable goods like agriculture and manufacturing. This im-
plies a negative sign for sectors producing non-tradeables. Country size, measured by popula-
tion, is expected to have a positive effect on relative employment in sectors that produce with 
economies of scale, for instance, agriculture and manufacturing. Natural resource wealth is 
expected to affect relative employment in those sectors positively, which use or process these 
resources. Human capital is expected to positively influence relative employment in sectors 
producing skill-intensive goods and services such as manufacturing and financial services. No 
prior expectations exist as to the effects of government policies on the employment structure. 
 
We use sectoral ILO employment data and all other data were drawn from the ‘World Devel-
opment Indicators’ data base of the World Bank. The longest time period covered was 1970-
2004. For each sector three regressions are reported in Table 1: the first equation does not 
include an aging variable and the second and third consider the two proxies of aging, respec-
tively. The reported final specifications in table 1 were found through robustness tests so as to 




                                                 
10 The robustness tests were performed for each regression by including successively those independent variables 
discussed in the beginning of this section, which were not considered in the final specifications reported in table 
1.   13
Table 1
Panel Regression Results of Sectoral Employment Share Functions
Equation: (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
Independent  Variables:
Sample period
Constant -27.509 -24.962 -28.695 -11.059 -12.198 -11.607 -21.246 -20.203 -23.735
(-10.761)*** (-8.475)*** (-8.833)*** (-12.531)*** (-14.553)*** (-13.538)*** (-9.535)*** (-9.393)*** (-11.059)***
ln (real per capita GDP) 3.024 3.104 3.0661 1.289 1.026 1.123 4.178 4.434 3.836
(5.616)*** (5.747)*** (5.712)*** (7.053)*** (5.902)*** (6.305)*** (8.358)*** (9.185)*** (7.999)***
(ln real per capita GDP)
2 -0.194 -0.2004 -0.1994 -0.0643 -0.0518 -0.0561 -0.265 -0.271 -0.238
(-6.317)*** (-6.447)*** (-6.424)*** (-6.075)*** (-5.163)*** (-5.443)*** (-9.295)*** (-9.857)*** (-8.674)***
ln (Trade) 0.327 0.324 0.309 0.114 0.121 0.127
(5.606)*** (5.545)*** (5.321)*** (5.949)*** (6.654)*** (6.827)***
ln (Population) 0.856 0.821 0.787 0.169 0.262 0.3016
(4.841)*** (4.593)*** (4.293)*** (2.844)** (4.638)*** (5.065)***
ln (Gov. consumption expenditures/GDP) 0.1439 0.1510 0.1520 -0.102 -0.113 -0.1229
(2.544)** (2.652)*** (2.672)*** (-5.329)*** (-7.148)*** (-6.592)***
Agricultural resources 1/ 0.0108 0.0094 0.0093
(3.228)*** (2.660)*** (2.664)***
Natural resource endowment excluding  0.0034 0.0035 0.004 0.0357 0.0599 0.0634
agricultural resources  2/ (0.469) (0.496) (0.542) (1.637) (2.826)*** (3.012)***
Natural resource endowment including  -0.449 -0.447 -0.448
agricultural resources 3/ (-8.382)*** (-8.856)*** (-8.643)***
ln (Elderly/Total Population) 4/ -0.18 0.485 -1.38
(-1.969)** (11.551)*** (-9.057)***
ln (Elderly/Population ages 15-64) 5/ -0.182 0.401 -1.38
(-1.477) (8.434)*** (-9.057)***
adj. R
2 0.93051 0.93102 0.93079 0.8978 0.9091 0.9041 0.881853 0.890214 0.891855
S.E. of regression 0.28044 0.27830 0.27850 0.093688 0.08836 0.09075 0.337645 0.325478 0.323037
Akaike info criterion 0.3698 0.35406 0.35664 -1.823763 -1.940065 -1.886682 0.738193 0.665595 0.650537
F-Statistic of the joint 
significance of all regressors 173.328 171.9443 173.5822 116.1921 130.6577 123.2437 101.8959 109.3348 111.1812
C o u n t r i e s 5 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 4
Observations (unbalanced sample) 1156 1156 1156 1155 1155 1155 1150 1150 1150
Note: Pooled Least Squares method with cross-sections fixed effects (dummies) and period fixed effects (dummies) is used on the assumption that the 
explanatory variables are exogenous. Both the joint cross-section and the joint period fixed effects were in each regression statistically highly significant.
T-statistics in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance of the respective variable at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5% percent level;
*** indicates significance at the 1% percent level.
1/ Proxy for agricultural resources: permanent cropland per capita.
2/ Resources depletion index: Depletion of energy and minerals, and net forest depletion, in percent of gross national income, and each type of depletion given 
    equal weight. From the World Bank, World Development Indicators.
3/ Share of primary exports (agricultural raw materials, ores, basic metals, fuels) in exports of goods and services. 
4/ Natural logarithm of the ratio of elderly (ratio of persons ages 65 and above to the total population).
5/ Natural logarithm of the old age dependency ratio (ratio of persons ages 65 and above to the population ages 15-64).
Source: Author's calculations.
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Table 1 concluded
Panel Regression Results of Sectoral Employment Share Functions. 
Equation (7a) (7b) (7c) (8a) (8b) (8c) (9a) (9b) (9c)
Independent Variables:
Sample period
Constant -9.484 -9.167 -8.982068 5.601 5.0337 5.282 2.135 0.982 2.0645
(-15.236)*** (-14.017)*** (-13.768)*** (3.116)*** (2.896)*** (3.007)*** (2.051)** (0.830) (1.976)**
ln (real per capita GDP) 1.317 1.249 1.2152 1.415 0.716 0.881 0.6818 0.6516 0.6506
(9.574)*** (8.678)*** (8.492)*** (3.952)*** (2.007)** (2.452)** (3.114)*** (2.976)*** (2.931)***
(ln real per capita GDP)
2 -0.065 -0.062 -0.0597 -0.0532 -0.0188 -0.0256 -0.0287 -0.027 -0.0271
(-8.375)*** (-7.456)*** (-7.289)*** (-2.609)*** (-0.928) (-1.254) (-2.285)** (-2.145)** (-2.128)**
ln (Trade) -0.0592 -0.0584 -0.0591
(-2.817)*** (-2.785)*** (-2.809)***
ln (Population) -1.034 -0.877 -0.7984 -0.4193 -0.3511 -0.4016
(-8.293)*** (-7.186)*** (-6.282)*** (-5.873)*** (-4.462)*** (-5.404)***
ln (Gov. consumption expenditures/GDP) 0.050 0.0541 0.0561
(2.785)*** (2.98)*** (3.097)***
ln (Gross fixed capital formation) -0.165 -0.162 -0.163
(7.773)*** (7.623)*** (7.586)***
ln (Human resources) 1/ 0.0771 0.0882 0.0884 0.0722 0.079 0.0739
(5.412)*** (6.378)*** (6.302)*** (2.141)** (2.339)** (2.187)**
Asia financial crisis dummy 2/ 0.132 0.132 0.131 0.067 0.067 0.0667
(4.041)*** (4.029)*** (4.008)*** (2.223)** (2.235)** (2.222)**
ln (Elderly/Total Population) 3/ fragile sign 4/ 0.642 0.041
(7.961)*** (2.036)**
ln (Elderly/Population ages 15-64) 5/ fragile sign 4/ 0.571 0.045
(6.516)*** (0.855)
adj. R
2 0.896685 0.89682 0.898179 0.96598 0.968241 0.967517 0.943064 0.943319 0.943042
S.E. of regression 0.0942 0.094139 0.093516 0.151182 0.146072 0.147727 0.075461 0.075292 0.075475
Akaike info criterion -1.816448 -1.816993 -1.830256 -0.858952 -0.926786 -0.90425 -2.234627 -2.23797 -2.233109
F-Statistic of the joint 
significance of all regressors 120.9112 119.7219 121.4892 336.4753 356.8099 348.6209 166.424 165.1076 164.264
Countries 55 55 55 54 54 54 55 55 55
Observations (unbalanced sample) 1203 1203 1203 958 958 958 780 780 780
Note: Pooled Least Squares method with cross-sections fixed effects (dummies) and period fixed effects (dummies) is used on the assumption that the 
explanatory variables are exogenous. Both the joint cross-section and the joint period fixed effects were in each regression statistically highly significant. 
T-statistics in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance of the respective variable at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5% percent 
level; *** indicates significance at the 1% percent level.
1/ Sum of primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollment ratios from World Bank Development Indicators.
2/ Dummy variable representing the financial crisis shock during 1997 and 1998 in 5 Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Phillipines, Thailand).
    The variable attains the value one for these two years and these five countries, and zero otherwise.
3/ Natural logarithm of the ratio of elderly (ratio of persons ages 65 and above to the total population).
4/ Sign is highly fragile, i.e. it is switching dependent upon whether or not the variable is transformed into a natural logarithm. 














As can be seen in table 1 the proxies of aging raise in almost all cases the fit (i.e. they raise 
the adjusted R
2), improve the overall quality of the regressions and are consistently highly 
statistically significant. The first proxy of aging, the ratio of elderly to the population, has 
consistently a somewhat higher significance than the second one, the ratio of elderly to the 
labor force. For three of the nine sectors, namely ‘electricity, gas and water’, ‘construction’,   15
and ‘transport, storage and communication’, the estimated signs of the aging variables were 
not robust to variations in the specifications.  
It is interesting to note that this fragility of the estimated signs corresponds to conflicting re-
sults obtained in studies of the effects of aging on the structure of consumption demand as 
discussed briefly in the following section. Overall then we find that, ceteris paribus, aging 
causes shrinking relative employment in: 
-  agriculture and  
-  mining and quarrying.  
And it causes rising relative employment in: 
-  manufacturing, and in the services sectors: 
-  wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, 
-  financial and related services and  
-  community, social, and personal services.  
The effect of aging on employment is unclear with regard to the sectors:  
-  electricity, gas, and water, 
-  construction, and  
-  transport, storage, and communication.  
 
b.  Comparison with ‘normal’ structural change and with estimates of effects  
on the structure of private consumption goods and services 
 
 
Comparing our estimates with ‘normal’ structural change summarized in section 3, we find 
that only in two cases is aging estimated to affect relative employment in the opposite direc-
tion than ‘normal’ structural change: This refers to manufacturing and wholesale and retail 
trade, restaurants and hotels, which are ‘normally’ shrinking and where aging has a positive 
impact. Hence, aging may slow down the decline of relative employment in these two sectors. 
But since it promotes employment growth in the relatively large services sectors financial 
services –the fastest growing sector- and community, social, and personal services, and given 
that the three sectors, where the estimated impact of aging is unclear are not very large
11 and 
have a long run tendency to decline one may conclude that on balance aging is promoting 
normal ongoing structural change.  
                                                 
11 These sectors are electricity, gas, and water, construction, and transport, storage and communication. Together 
they account on average for about 13 percent of total employment in the group of the 15 OECD countries with 
highest per capita income.    16
We may also note that the sectors, where aging promotes relative employment growth, are -
with the exception of manufacturing- services sectors. These tend to have relatively low pro-
ductivity growth. Hence, aging may have an overall somewhat negative effect on long-term 
average productivity growth. 
 
Finally, table 2 compares our regression results with those of the only currently available 
other study that estimates employment effects of aging (Börsch-Supan 2003).
12 There are, 
however, several more studies that estimate effects of aging on consumption demand in indus-
trial countries (OECD 2005, Lührmann 2005, and Buslei et al. 2007). It is interesting to note 
that these studies and that of Börsch-Supan (2003b) agree in the estimated sign of the effects 
of aging with regard to most groups of goods and services. The only groups where there are 
differences among them are energy, education and leisure, and furniture and home electronics.  
 
All these studies consider, however, only effects of aging on private consumption goods and 
services – extended in Börsch-Supan (2003b) to derive also employment effects in producing 
these goods and services – and thus they consider only a part of the demand side of the econ-
omy. Hence, they cannot be directly compared to our results for the sources side of the whole 
economy. Nevertheless, in table 2 an attempt was made to assign consumption goods and ser-
vices, shown on the right side of the table, roughly to the sectors of the sources side of GDP, 
shown on the left side of the table. On each side of the table the estimated effects of aging are 
shown. As one can see the results are broadly consistent with each other. There is only one 
case of conflicting signs, namely in the group of services with regard to education and leisure.  
But regarding this group of goods and services the mentioned other studies on effects of aging 
on consumption demand did not agree on the estimated sign.  
Overall, our estimated employment effects are consistent with the empirical studies on the 
effects of aging.  
                                                 
12 The methodology used in Börsch-Supan (2003b) is to use today’s age specific private consumption for goods 
and services and combine it with a population forecast to derive the future demand structure of consumption. In a 
next step the projected groups of consumption goods and services are multiplied with today’s sectoral labor 
productivity to obtain a forecast of future sectoral employment changes. Since the labor productivity figures are 
available for sectors classified according the sources side of GDP, they need to be assigned to the groups of 
consumption goods and services. This allocation ‘key’ is not shown in the paper of Börsch-Supan (2003). Thus, 
this analysis uses several assumptions that offer room for discussions and arguments.    17
Table 2 Effects of population aging on sectoral employment 
Sources of GDP: employment changes in all 
sectors (Regression results, table 1) 
Uses of GDP: employment changes in goods 
and services sectors (Börsch-Supan 2003b) 
Agriculture  - Food    - 
Mining and Quarrying  - 
   
Industry    
Electricity, Gas and Water  ?  Energy + 
Clothing and shoes  - 
Furniture and home electron-
ics  + 
Health and body care  + 
Manufacturing + 
Other housekeeping goods  - 
Construction ?    
Services     
Transport, storage and commu-
nication:  ?  Transport and communication  - 
Community, social and personal  
services  + 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels  + 
Education and leisure  - 





















Financial services, real estate 
and related services  + 
Government purchases 
Investment 





















Source: Own calculations and Börsch-Supan, 2003b.  
 
 
V.  Concluding remarks 
 
Our empirical results of effects of aging on employment are broadly consistent with those 
reported in the literature. However, they are statistically robust, they were derived by control-
ling for other important influences on sectoral employment, and they cover the whole econ-
omy, whereas the other approaches employed so far are restricted to the structure of private 
consumption. We find that aging accelerates  
•  the relative decline of sectors:  
  - Agriculture,  
  - Mining + Quarrying,  
•  the relative growth of sectors: 
  - financial services, real estate and related services   18
  - community, social, and personal services, 
  - health related services, 
  - possibly entertainment and services related to leisure and cultural activities. 
And aging slows down the relative decline of manufacturing.  
Hence, an overall interesting new result of our analysis is that aging causes an overall accel-
eration of ongoing structural change and mostly promotion of sectors with relatively low pro-
ductivity growth. This may dampen somewhat long-term average productivity growth. How-
ever, considerably stronger long-term productivity growth would be needed to offset the im-
pact in aging societies on per capita income of a decreasing number of working persons rela-
tive to the total population. Hence, this analysis has a clear policy implication, which is the 
support of reforms to raise productivity growth, to increase labor participation and to reduce 
upward pressure of aging on government expenditure and downward pressure on government 
revenues. Examples of reforms to raise productivity growth could be promotion of capital-
funds based pension system, investment in education, investment in information and other 
types of technology, and increase of labor mobility. Examples of reforms to increase labor 
participation may be a reduction (abolishment) of incentives for early retirement, other meas-
ures to increase the average pension age and to raise participation rates, for instance of 
woman and through improved regulation of migration.  
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